




Police Cooperation in Europe, China and 








The regulation of police cooperation across national and international jurisdictional 
boundaries differs significantly around the world. It ranges from formal, legally binding 
international treaties and agreements, to informal customs between agencies. While these are 
the two most extreme cases of formality and informality, many types of regulation are 
situated somewhere on a continuum between these two points, such as Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) between agencies or Associations of Chiefs of Police. There are hence 
different ‘stages’ of formalisation and enforceability of regulation. A customary good 
relationship between two police officers, two police stations or two agencies or departments 
can result in frequent exchange of information, mutual assistance and even joint 
investigations at an informal, unregulated level. In some instances, such informal cooperation 
has led to the establishment of more formalised initiatives, such as MOU between agencies, 
departments and nation states, or even to legally binding bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
 
 
agreements. Nation states have also established international regulations governing police 
cooperation not instituted subsequent to developments in policing practice. This ‘top-down’ 
regulation can equally influence transnational policing. This chapter tries to determine what 
influences the different developmental stages of regulation and how they relate to levels of 
trust and legitimacy.  
Police cooperation strategies between Member States of the European Union (EU), between 
Mainland China, Taiwan and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, 
and between Australian federal, state and territory jurisdictions are an important aspect of 
their fight against crime. While the abolition of controlled borders is still a recent 
phenomenon in the EU, Australian states and territories effectively abolished border controls 
with the advent of Federation in 1901. Taiwan and – despite their return to Chinese 
sovereignty in the late 1990s – the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and 
Macao participate like autonomous nation states in police cooperation in China. While formal 
police cooperation frameworks have evolved at EU level in recent years, police cooperation 
in Australia and China still relies predominantly on informal police-to-police strategies in 
border regions. This chapter explores whether formalisation of police cooperation (as in the 
EU) is a sign of trust, or whether formalisation might be spurred by a lack of trust. Different 
levels of influence of trust on the three (very) different systems that all require internal law 
enforcement cooperation within them are determined. The existence (or not) of trust will 
furthermore be linked to the concept of legitimacy and in particular whether the perception of 
an agency or system as legitimate influences the readiness to cooperate with it and whether 
systems cooperating on the grounds of legitimacy tend to formalise their interactions or not.  
With a view to the regulation of cooperation strategies, such as cross-border 
incursions, information exchange and joint investigations, each region examined in this 
 
 
chapter has developed differently. Australia has no formalised legal framework guiding law 
enforcement activity across borders, but a federal police with powers across all jurisdictions 
for a select number of offences. The EU has developed a significant number of rather detailed 
cooperation frameworks, whereas Greater China, as one nation state, still relies 
predominantly on international informal strategies, such as Interpol and liaison officers to 
cooperate across borders. At the international level, cooperation is still mainly informal and 
no legal framework has developed. When addressing trust between the jurisdictions and the 
impact on regulation, legitimacy needs to be discussed as a significant factor impacting on 
trust. The systems discussed here have therefore been chosen for their differences in the area 
of fundamental rights protection, which might impact on both trust between police and 
formalisation of cross-border law enforcement practices. Also relevant for the formalisation 
of police cooperation strategies are common approaches to fair trial rights. More broadly, the 
relationship between similarities and differences in human rights frameworks and the 
generation of transnational police regulation are likely to be interconnected.  
The three systems are analysed with a view to the highest level of diversity at the 
international level as a benchmark. First, the EU is assessed as a region that has formed its 
own human rights framework applying to a number of significantly different systems and has 
developed a high level of formalisation through international (EU) treaties and agreements 
regulating police and justice cooperation. Second, the chapter addresses Greater China, which 
is composed of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Mainland China. The four states, while not 
being sovereign nation states, have distinctly different histories, legal systems and police 
organisations, which present challenges for cross-border law enforcement. Australia, the third 
system investigated, is a federal state and its states and territories are independent criminal 
law jurisdictions with separate police forces, making cooperation across their borders 
 
 
necessary. However, the cooperating states and territories adhere to very similar procedural 
rules and human rights requirements. Australia has been chosen as an example for the impact 
of greatest similarity (but no uniformity) of procedural and human rights requirements in 
jurisdictions on police cooperation regulation. This chapter is the first to analyse cross-border 
legal regulation and its relationship to trust and legitimacy in the area of police cooperation in 
the three different systems.1 
 
 
II. Legitimacy in a Global Context 
 
Jürgen Habermas was one of many who foresaw a legitimacy problem in Europe stating that 
‘the democratic processes constituted at the level of the nation state lag hopelessly behind the 
economic integration taking place at the supranational level’.2 The 1990s was a time where 
legitimacy was discussed in a broader context and in particular with a view to European 
integration. However, when focusing on legitimacy and international policing, much less 
                                                 
1 These findings are based on an extensive literature review in the area of transnational policing: S Hufnagel, 
‘Cross-Border Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ in T Carty (ed), Oxford Bibliographies in International Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). 
2 J Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ reprinted as Appendix II in J Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (trans W Rehg, Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 1996) 491. 
 
 
literature has been produced than on legitimacy and domestic policing.3 Habermas’ fear was 
that the political systems of countries could not keep up with the pace of globalisation. While 
he was relating this to Europe, one could today ask whether this is not a problem that spans 
the globe rather than just one region of the world. However, we need to define legitimacy to 
make it applicable in a cross-border cooperation context. There is generally confusion around 
the definition of legitimacy and disciplines, such as law, sociology, political science and 
many others, have different views. To understand the concept of legitimacy better and to 
ultimately link it to trust in a transnational context, we therefore first need to determine which 
definition should be used. 
The first necessary observation is that legitimacy in the transnational policing context 
does not apply between the state and the citizen, but between agents of the state. Between 
these agents, however, the same basic notions of cooperation exist as between the state and 
its subordinates, namely that the more legitimate the respective other authority is believed to 
be, the more cooperation with this authority will ensue.4 In the context of ‘inter pares’ 
cooperation, this concept cannot be stretched to the point of there being a ‘ruler’ and a 
‘ruled’, but the concept of cooperation still depends on the acknowledgement of legitimacy. 
Some authors would however argue that in the context of inter-agency cooperation there is an 
aspect of ‘coercion’ and ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’ and ‘power’ and ‘acceptance of power’ and even 
                                                 
3 Of course with prominent exceptions, such as M den Boer, C Hillebrand and A Nölke, ‘Legitimacy under 
Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 
101; B Bowling and J Sheptycki, Global Policing (London, Sage, 2012). 
4 TR Tyler, Why People Obey the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Compliance (Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
 
of the loss of legitimacy of the partnership in the face of coercion.5 However, studies on the 
relationship between police underlying the latter assumption were not drawn from 
cooperation within the systems addressed in this chapter. Evidence for coercion between 
police of ‘stronger’ states towards ‘weaker’ states could not be observed between the entities 
of the systems assessed here. The most ‘coercive’ relationships in the present context exist 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States of the EU and between Mainland China and 
other administrative regions of China. Forms of coercion are nevertheless rarely mentioned as 
an impediment to cooperation by practitioners working in the systems addressed in this study, 
while the issue is frequently claimed to bar cooperation in the wider context of international 
police cooperation.6 
This chapter conceives of the concept of legitimacy as linked to the implementation of 
international human rights, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This is in itself a 
questionable way of constructing legitimacy when legitimacy is usually attributed by a 
society as a whole.7 Linking it to certain standards like human rights that state agents, such as 
the police, have to meet is, however, a way of determining legitimacy when it is not possible 
to gauge whether ‘society as a whole’ perceives its state agents as legitimate. This is justified 
                                                 
5 Bowling and Sheptycki, above n 3, 7, 17–18. 
6 Interviews for a previous study (S Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders – Comparative Perspectives 
on Law Enforcement within the EU and Australia (Farnham, Ashgate, 2013)) and a current study on 
international law enforcement conducted by the author, predominantly interviewing international liaison 
officers, police involved in peacekeeping missions, Interpol and Europol staff. 
7 See, eg, J Jackson, B Bradford, M Hough, A Myhill, P Quinton and TR Tyler,‘Why Do People Comply with 
the Law?’ (2012) 52 British Journal of Criminology 1051. 
 
 
for the purposes of this chapter as the view of society is of limited relevance, while the view 
of another state’s agent is paramount. Those agents, in this study of the police, have to make 
sure they comply with their own state’s standards. This compliance could be endangered if 
the state they are cooperating with, for example, giving information to or getting information 
from, is not abiding by equivalent or similar standards.  
When recalling earlier notions of legitimacy, usually attributed to the writings of Max 
Weber on the social dynamics of authority,8 it appears that legitimacy is deliberately not 
linked to a power dynamic (or coercion as discussed above), but to the cooperation that 
ensues outside this power dynamic. Legitimacy is the ‘other’ reason why cooperation with an 
authority eventuates. Legitimacy is a quality that is attributed to and results in voluntary 
cooperation with the authority displaying this quality. In cross-border police cooperation, as 
in the relationship between a state and its subordinates, authority for certain actions is 
delegated to another state actor. This can be rather specific in the area of police cooperation, 
such as the carrying out of an arrest, search or seizure, or more oblique, like the transfer of 
information. As such acts have to be carried out in a way that is acceptable for the 
commissioning party, there needs to be a similar benchmark as to what a ‘legitimate’ act is. 
This, by contrast, can be perceived very differently in the people-to-state relationship rather 
than in the police-to-police relationship. In the former the act has to protect the rights given to 
the state’s subjects; in the latter the act has to be fast, efficient and leading to benefits for 
investigators. Human rights could therefore be the wrong benchmark when looking at 
international police cooperation. Legitimacy in transnational law enforcement should then 
                                                 




rather be defined as efficiency, but this would require the complete separation of the notion of 
legitimacy in the police-to-police context from the people-to-state relationship. This is, 
however, not possible as the police are part of the state and hence part of the people-to-state 
relationship. If legitimacy in police-to-police cooperation were to be solely judged by 
efficiency, the relationship between the citizens and the state could be violated.  
Furthermore, the rules binding the state and its agents function as regulators of state 
behaviour. If they protect the individual and are enforceable, they can prevent the interaction 
of law enforcement agents across borders. This strengthens legitimacy in the state-to-people 
relationship but can inhibit cooperation between state actors. We therefore have to choose 
which notion of legitimacy should apply. What is legitimate in the state-to-people 
relationship, and at the same time in the state-to-state relationship? Is the legitimate state 
actor more trusted by another state actor? Do the variants in this relationship shape the 




A. Linking Trust to Legitimacy in the Area of Police Cooperation 
 
In the various studies the author has undertaken in the field, all practitioners interviewed have 
mentioned trust as a major positive impact factor on cooperation. Trust therefore seems to be 
crucial in law enforcement cooperation. Psychological research has shown that shared moral 
norms and values form a basis for trust. The more we perceive others as having a similar 
 
 
value system, the more we consider them trustworthy.9 Applied to an organisation such as the 
police, bound by legal frameworks, this should permit a conclusion that a shared adherence to 
fundamental rights obligations leads to common norms and values, which in turn lead to trust. 
The opposite could however equally be true. Another factor that can lead to value 
commonalities is the need to produce results, to be efficient and to pursue a common goal. On 
many occasions, this might complicate the maintenance of legal values. However, it is 
important in the case of police to distinguish shared legal values and shared goals. The 
distinction might explain why cooperation happens not only between agencies with similar 
human rights frameworks, but also with those that have very different legal restraints.  
The legitimacy of an institution might rest on the legal standards they abide by. 
However, research in the area of inter-agency cooperation has shown that it also often comes 
down to who is known in the other organisation personally.10 It follows that there are three 
broad reasons for the establishment of a trust relationship between agencies: common norms, 
common goals and personal contacts. Trust indicators hence only partly conform to the 
concept of legitimacy, defined as adherence to human rights standards. Some authors have 
argued that trust affects legitimacy and legitimacy affects trust, as the more legitimate 
agencies are, the more they are likely to trust each other.11 This chapter aims to look into this 
                                                 
9 GM Breakwell, The Psychology of Risk (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 160. 
10 See, eg, Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, 86–87. 






assertion in the context of inter-agency cooperation. While an indicator for trust is the troika 
of common norms, goals and personal contacts, the indicator for legitimacy is the respect for 
human rights. Whether the two are connected shall be assessed through observations of the 
formation of regulation between state entities. 
A question that could be asked is whether trust was the basis for cooperation 
mechanisms in the EU, Greater China and Australia. If it was, this should have led to greater 
legitimacy. Alternatively, legitimacy could have contributed to the establishment of the 
mechanism(s) and greater trust. There could hence be two types of mechanism that need to be 
distinguished, one based on trust, or the cooperation between practitioners leading to 
regulation/legitimacy, the other established at the (supra-)national level with a view to 
engendering trust and enabling cooperation between practitioners. A further question is 
whether the creation of regulation in itself can create legitimacy, for example, protecting 
suspects from informal circumvention of their rights, such as privacy. While the relationship 
between the agencies could be legitimised, do the agencies themselves gain legitimacy 
through the regulation as a manifestation that another agent trusts them to the extent that they 
enter into a formal relationship? Could this not be the antithesis to trust, as regulation should 
not be needed when there is trust? To answer the question, this chapter now examines the 
different relationships to shed light on the interconnection between trust, legitimacy and 
regulation in police cooperation. 
 
 




A significant number of bilateral and multilateral cooperation strategies exists between the 
Member States of the EU.12 They shall not be outlined in detail, as there are more than 133 
EU-level security provisions that highlight more impressively the level of formalisation in 
this region of the world.13 However, it should be noted that bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation initiatives influenced EU-wide formalisation. Some of them spread throughout 
the Member States of the EU, leading to a de facto harmonisation of policing strategies, such 
as the Common Centres (or Police and Customs Cooperation Centres).14 Others started at a 
multilateral level and were then taken up at EU level, such as the Schengen Convention. With 
regard to the trust analysis it should be noted that all mechanisms were based on a common 
goal: the fight against cross-border crime. Seeing that they were first established between 
neighbouring countries, they were very likely also fostered by personal contacts. For some 
cooperation mechanisms between EU Member States personal contacts were even the driving 
force and more crucial than the common goal, like in the Cross-Channel Intelligence 
Conference between the United Kingdom, France and Belgium.15 While there was a clear 
need to cooperate in this region and hence a common goal, the personal and political 
                                                 
12 Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, ch 2. 
13 There were already 133 EU-level security provisions encompassing both substantive criminal law and 
procedural measures before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010. 
14 O Felsen, ‘European Police Cooperation: The Example of the German–French Centre for Police and Customs 
Cooperation Kehl (GZ Kehl)’ in S Hufnagel, S Bronitt and C Harfield (eds), Cross-Border Law Enforcement 
Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation – European, Australian and Asia-Pacific Perspectives (London, 
Routledge, 2012). 
15 F Gallagher, ‘Sheer Necessity: The Kent Experience of Regional Transfrontier Police Cooperation’ (2002) 12 
Regional & Federal Studies 111, 121. 
 
 
animosities were too pronounced to lead to advanced cooperation. This changed when the 
head of the Kent police was replaced by a chief of police with diplomatic skills. The personal 
contacts thereby enabled the trust the common goals could not achieve alone.  
Furthermore, it could be assumed that between EU Member States a common value 
system is inherent through the implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Accession without implementation is not possible. However, the situation is more 
complicated than this as even the same fundamental supranational right might be 
implemented differently in national criminal procedure, leading to de facto incompatibilities 
when it comes to cross-border cooperation. 
While EU-level legislation in the area of policing and security is extensive, it can be 
questioned whether this legislation has the power to create legitimacy. Too much and 
overlapping legislation might even lead to the opposite outcome: a lack of trust towards the 
system imposing them and a lack of coherence. The recent opt-out of some EU countries with 
regard to EU security provisions and, most prominently, the United Kingdom ‘Brexit’ 
decision might be indicators that extensive supranational regulation can destroy the trust in 
the supranational entity, which in turn might affect its legitimacy. This does, however, not 
mean that the trust between the nation states or their legitimacy with regard to police 
cooperation is affected. The question is, however, whether the implementation of the 
supranational regulation in the bilateral context creates more trust and legitimacy. It is 
unlikely that 133 instruments will do so. Studies by other authors have already concluded that 
most of the measures have no relevance in practice.16 Considering that the number of 
                                                 
16 L Block, From Politics to Policing: The Rationality Gap in EU Council Policy-Making (The Hague, Eleven 
International Publishing, 2011) 55. 
 
 
instruments is vast, only a few and only those that have been considered relevant in practice 
shall be addressed here.  
The most prominent formalised cooperation mechanism so far is the ‘Europol 
Convention’ (signed by the then 15 EU Member States on 26 July 1995), which came into 
effect on 1 July 1999 and has, since 2010, been replaced by a Council Decision.17 A new 
Europol Regulation will enter into force on 1 May 2017. Europol can be divided into four 
different parts. It has a board of management, consisting of representatives of the Member 
States and a representative of the Commission.18 It therefore employs an intergovernmental 
structure of governance. The head of Europol is its director. Europol further consists of the 
actual database, a liaison officer network and the national units. Falling short of operational 
powers is the EU-wide network of liaison officers, who exchange information and 
intelligence on transnational crime.19 A liaison officer from each of the EU Member States is 
situated at Europol to enable easier access to information.20 In addition to liaison officers, 
there are national units of Europol established in each Member State, which are the only 
competent liaison bodies between Europol and the Member State authorities. Direct contacts 
between Europol and designated competent authorities in the Member States, governed by 
                                                 
17 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 Establishing the European Police Office (Europol) [2009] OJ L121/37; also 
‘Europol Decision’, previously Europol Convention: Council Act of 26 July 1995 Drawing up the Convention 
based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the Establishment of a European Police Office 
(Europol Convention) [1995] OJ C316/2. 
18 See Article 37 Europol Decision. 
19 I Loader, ‘Policing, Securitisation and Democratisation in Europe’ (2002) 2 Criminal Justice 126, 128. 
20 Article 9 Europol Decision.   
 
 
national law, have been allowed since 2004.21 This indicates a growing ceding of sovereignty 
concerns by the Member States in relation to Europol. This is not only advantageous in 
relation to efficiently providing information and accessing the database, but also in relation to 
face-to-face contacts and informal information exchange between the officers stationed at 
Europol. Europol’s liaison officer network is of particular importance, as the exchange of 
sensitive information requires a high level of trust not only between the Member States, but 
also between the police practitioners on the ground.22 The liaison officers of all Member 
States, and even non-EU Member States, are co-located in one building to encourage the 
establishment of close working relationships. The liaison officers are not supervised by 
Europol, which gives them greater freedom to cooperate informally.23 Practitioners accepted 
this network immediately and appreciate the opportunity to know their counterparts from 
other Member States personally, as it enhances trust.24 In addition, the possibility to 
cooperate formally, as well as informally, within this network was stated to be an 
advantage.25 
                                                 
21 See the Protocol Drawn up on the Basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a 
European Police Office (Europol Convention), Amending that Convention (Danish Protocol) [2004] OJ C2/3. 
22 V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 165. 
23 Ibid, 165–66. 




Another important strategy is the 2000 EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters.26 Apart from other aims, it established joint investigation teams (JITs) in 
the EU. JITs were included in the Convention as a new mechanism to coordinate cross-border 
investigations, which aims at changing the established practice of parallel investigations. 
While initially a resisted mechanism by practitioners, they are today a commonly used 
strategy to investigate cross-border crime.27 According to Article 13 of the Convention, a JIT 
is an ‘operational investigative team consisting of representatives of law enforcement and 
other authorities from different member states and possibly from other organisations like 
Europol and Eurojust’. The purpose of a JIT is jointly to investigate a criminal case; the 
teams are bi-national or multinational, likely operating from one location, possibly 
multidisciplinary and are set up for a single investigation within an agreed time frame. An 
important aspect of the introduction of JITs was their advantage compared with ‘traditional’ 
cross-border investigations, the so-called ‘parallel investigations’. Parallel investigations 
focus on cooperation through exchange of international letters of request (ILOR) in cross-
border investigations, commonly based on the 1959 Council of Europe Convention, but 
specified in bilateral and multilateral agreements.28 When a parallel investigation is set up 
between two or more Member States, investigation teams can work on the same case within 
their respective jurisdiction simultaneously. Information exchange and the coordination of the 
                                                 
26 EU Council Act of 29 May 2000 Establishing in Accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union 
the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union 
[2005] OJ C197/3 (entered into force 23 August 2005); also ‘2000 Mutual Legal Assistance Convention’ or 
simply ‘Mutual Legal Assistance Convention’. 
27 Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, 221. 
28 See, eg, Articles 39 and 40 of the Schengen Convention. 
 
 
investigation are conducted through ILOR exchanges between the participating countries.29 
In the best case scenario, ILORs establish a legal basis for the direct and immediate exchange 
of intelligence and determine the preliminary measures necessary in the course of the 
investigation that can be taken. If particular investigative measures become necessary in one 
jurisdiction, such as communication interception, searches, interrogations or confiscation, 
additional ILORs can be issued.30 This cumbersome back and forth of requests is not needed 
with JITs established under the 2000 Convention, which makes them a useful tool in cross-
border cooperation. While practitioners were initially reluctant to use them, they have since 
become a frequent tool in EU cooperation.31 JITs are furthermore assisted by Eurojust, which 
is legally based on the Eurojust Decision.32 Eurojust national members can, for example, 
assist in the setting up of JITs, provide resources and help determine under which rules of 
procedure evidence needs to be gathered to be applicable in the relevant trial jurisdiction. 
Eurojust also has further competences in the area of judicial cooperation. 
The question arises whether the above cooperation mechanisms have increased trust 
between the participating agencies or were themselves born out of trust. In the case of 
Europol and Eurojust, the fact that they gather together practitioners from all Member (and 
even non-Member) States is an important factor as it establishes personal contacts, which in 
                                                 
29 L Block‚ ‘Combating Organized Crime in Europe: Practicalities of Police Cooperation’ (2008) 2(1) Policing: 
A Journal of Policy and Practice 76. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, 218–19. 
32 Council Decision of 15 July 2009 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Council Decision 
2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime [2009] OJ L138/14.  
 
 
turn can lead to greater trust. JITs could be said not to initiate personal contacts for further 
cooperation, but to enable personal interaction during an investigation that crosses borders. 
Another element of trust, common norms/values, is also fulfilled to a certain extent by all 
three mechanisms as they prescribe a certain way of engaging with each other (eg, 
competences and data protection regimes). All agents participating in these instruments have 
to adhere to the same rules even though they might come from different systems. Finally, the 
common goal defined for these instruments is cross-border law enforcement within the EU. 
While this broader goal will be inherent to all agents cooperating through these mechanisms, 
the more specific goals might nevertheless be different. Consideration in one country might 
also be given to protecting the identity of a source, or not endangering a further domestic 
investigation. This could then lead to conflicting goals between agencies. The interesting 
observation on the three above mechanisms is, however, that they provide the forum to 
harmonise these goals. For example, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom overcame their 
major differences in disclosure regimes by resorting to the Europol mechanism. Under UK 
law, sensitive information about police operations, such as the identity of informants or 
operational technique, can be exempt from disclosure to the defence (the doctrine of public 
interest immunity),33 while Dutch practitioners are bound to potentially disclose all 
information in criminal proceedings.34 If information is therefore classified as sensitive, it 
cannot be disclosed by the United Kingdom to the JIT with the Netherlands. Faced with this 
major impediment, the UK authorities used the Europol channel to provide sensitive 
                                                 
33 See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (UK) ss 1–21; Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) ss 32–39. 
34 C Rijken, ‘Joint Investigation Teams: Principles, Practice, and Problems. Lessons Learnt from the First 
Efforts to Establish a JIT’ (2006) 2(2) Utrecht Law Review 99, 113. 
 
 
information to the JIT and the source of information remained protected.35 The shortcomings 
of the 2000 Convention were overcome by innovative ad hoc practitioner cooperation efforts, 
using another EU cooperation mechanism.36 What proved to be important in carrying out the 
investigation was not the legal framework, but ‘good personal contacts, the ability to bridge 
cultural differences, a shared interest and a good knowledge of the legal system of the 
cooperation partner’.37 
Another initiative that is worth mentioning here is CEPOL, the European Police 
College, which was founded in order to create a network of police officials from all Member 
States and harmonise European policing standards through training.38 CEPOL promotes 
training and education through seminars, workshops and the exchange of police officers at 
senior levels; they can work for a limited amount of time in other countries and learn about 
another system.39 Cooperation mechanisms with a focus on training and more generally 
knowledge exchange can be found in all three systems examined for this study. They are not 
only crucial in promoting trust between practitioners, but can also contribute to the 
harmonisation of practice and enhance cooperation. Practitioners participating in in CEPOL 
seminars stressed that the major advantage of the events was getting to know practitioners 
                                                 
35 Ibid, 114. 
36 See Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, ch 2, subsections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2. 
37 See the interview with UK–NL JIT member cited in Block, From Politics to Policing, above n 16. 





from other Member States who could then be contacted directly in cross-border 
investigations. 
The knowledge we gain by looking at the different cooperation mechanisms with 
regard to trust and legitimacy is rather limited. First, the fact that practitioners trust each other 
if they work more closely together does not prove that the jurisdictions cooperating trust each 
other more or are becoming more legitimate. No conclusion can be drawn from the above 
examples with regard to the trust between the systems more generally. What could be 
inferred is that the fact that practitioners are brought together in the different initiatives under 
a supranational framework is in itself a sign of trust as it fosters informal cooperation that 
should not be encouraged between systems that do not acknowledge each other’s legitimacy. 
The fact that formalised legal frameworks exist enabling practitioner engagement and 
fostering cooperation could therefore be a sign of trust. This would certainly hold true if it 
could be observed that systems that do have a legitimacy discrepancy are not formalising 
their cooperation and are not fostering practitioner contact and training. The next system to 
be evaluated is therefore Greater China, which encompasses fewer systems, but a greater 
diversity of values and norms than the EU. 
 
 
C. Strategies of Police Cooperation in Greater China 
 
While Greater China only includes four distinctly different jurisdictions, the differences 
between them are great and the challenges to police cooperation significant. Article 2 of the 
 
 
Basic Law for Hong Kong40 provides the ‘one country, two systems’ political settlement. 
However, there are more than two systems at play in the region. The Mainland Chinese 
system draws heavily on foreign legal models.41 The Chinese criminal code42 and the code of 
criminal procedure43 in particular borrow from both the Soviet and German civil systems.44 
Hong Kong, as a former British colony is governed by the common law system, which 
continues even after recession to the PRC in 1997.45 Macau, the other special administrative 
region (SAR) in Greater China and until 1999 under Portuguese rule, has a ‘potpourri’ system 
similar to the mainland, mainly based on Portuguese law, which in turn borrowed from 
                                                 
40 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (April 
1990) (‘Basic Law’) adopted on 4 April 1990 by the Seventh National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China at its Third Session. 
41 PB Potter, ‘The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power’ (1999) 159 
The China Quarterly 673. 
42 The Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress on 1 July 1979; revised at the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 14 March 
1997; and promulgated by Order No 83 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 14 March 1997. 
43 The Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress on 1 July 1979; amended pursuant to the Decision on Amending the Criminal Procedure Law of the 
People’s Republic of China adopted at the Fourth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 17 
March 1996; and amended on 14 March 2012. 
44 Potter, above n 41, 674. 
45 Y Ghai, ‘The Intersection of Chinese Law and Common Law in the Special Administrative Region of Hong 
Kong: Question of Technique or Politics?’ in J Oliveira and P Cardinal (eds), One Country, Two Systems, Three 
Legal Orders – Perspectives of Evolution (Berlin, Springer, 2009)13–14. 
 
 
German law.46 Macau, like Hong Kong, does not apply the death penalty, which distinguishes 
the two administrative regions from the Mainland and has the potential to complicate police 
and justice cooperation between these jurisdictions.47 Taiwan, like Mainland China and 
Macau, is a civil law (inquisitorial) system.48 It contains a mixture of Imperial Chinese law, 
contemporary Chinese law, principles and concepts of civil law systems, such as Germany 
and Japan, as well as the United States. These differences in systems and legal heritage also 
have an impact on the regulation and structure of policing within them. 
Furthermore, the international and national human rights situation in Greater China is 
complicated. China is a signatory to the ICCPR, but has not ratified it. For this reason, 
Taiwan can equally not ratify it. Hong Kong and Macao have granted adherence to the 
ICCPR in their Basic Laws and therefore to some extent implemented it without being able to 
be a party to the Convention.49 There is hence a far greater legitimacy discrepancy between 
the systems in China than in the EU, at least according to the definition of legitimacy relying 
on common human rights requirements. If the regulation of cooperation mechanisms was a 
sign for trust between systems, there should be no formalised cooperation relationships 
between the systems adhering to the ICCPR and those not doing so within Greater China. 
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Unsurprisingly, a common legal framework on police cooperation does in fact not 
exist in Greater China. However, a number of formal agreements were established bilaterally. 
An example of a bilateral cooperation framework is the 1988 Mutual Case Assistance 
Scheme (MCAS) between Mainland China and Hong Kong.50 MCAS was established to 
investigate cross-border corruption cases. The agreement was first limited to Procurator 
Departments in Guangdong, but in 2000 was further extended through collaboration with the 
Supreme People’s Procurator Department to other provinces.51 This manifests a harmonising 
effect of this agreement on other regions within Mainland China. It also shows that a 
common goal seems to overcome the general rule that regulation is only established between 
systems that trust each other. The goal of fighting corruption was here stronger than the 
distrust created by divergent value systems. 
An example for trust between systems that have similarly limited application of 
international human rights standards is the 2009 Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and 
Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, which was concluded between Taiwan and Mainland 
China. It is a formal agreement52 and to a higher degree binding than, for example, an MOU. 
This agreement is the most comparable to EU mechanisms and encompasses measures 
similar to those available through the Schengen Convention, such as cross-border incursions 
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and mutual legal assistance. The closeness of Taiwan and Mainland China in the area of 
police cooperation is very surprising as Taiwan is not recognised by the PRC as a sovereign 
nation state. However, under the Cross-Strait Agreement both sides had established 
diplomatic organisations through which cooperation, for example, in criminal matters, could 
be conducted.53 A possible explanation is that the PRC and Taiwan both apply the death 
penalty and have a similar approach to fair trial rights. Cooperation between them, despite 
political discrepancies, relies on jurisdictional similarities, considering that both systems rely 
more on Imperial and contemporary Chinese law than Macau and Hong Kong. This stresses 
that a common value system can lead to closer cooperation, which could be a sign of trust. 
However, legitimacy is here put to the test as it could be established that both the existence, 
as well as the lack of legitimacy can lead to greater trust between organisations as long as 
they are situated within relatively similar legal systems.  
However, the level of engagement between all four systems forming Greater China is 
more comparable to international cooperation than to the close and regulated EU cross-border 
law enforcement. The ‘1994 Agreement’ established between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong confirmed the principle established previously, creating three different channels for 
mutual legal assistance. The first was Interpol, the second a direct link between Hong Kong 
and Guangdong province and the third were liaison officers of the Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS) stationed in Hong Kong.54 Cooperation through Interpol had been the long-established 
practice of operational police cooperation between the two parties during the 99-year British 
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lease on Hong Kong and the 1984 Sino–British Joint Liaison Group decided in 1989 that 
cooperation through Interpol should persist even after the return of Hong Kong to Chinese 
sovereignty in 1997.55 The fact that the two systems chose international cooperation 
mechanisms (Interpol and liaison officers) rather than measures more tailored to a regional 
context shows that the assumption of differences is greater than in regions such as the EU 
with more coherent value systems. 
While several bilateral regulated mechanisms exist in Greater China to enhance police 
cooperation across borders, cross-border law enforcement in this region is still predominantly 
based on informal and semi-formal cooperation mechanisms. However, between Taiwan and 
Mainland China a formalised framework can be observed. At the same time both of these 
entities have not ratified the ICCPR and still apply the death penalty. It appears that 
similarities in legitimacy foster the formalisation of cooperation mechanisms. More important 
than the legitimacy of systems seems to be the sharing of a common value base. Also, if the 
common goal is considered a priority in the systems, differences in the value base do not 
hinder cooperation as the anti-corruption cooperation between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong shows. China therefore provides a very good case study. Between all four systems in 
Greater China, formalisation did not occur, but bilateral formal cooperation exists between 
systems with greater similarities or with common goals. It also needs to be mentioned that 
despite the differences between the four systems there are common education and training 
initiatives, for example, between Mainland China, Macao and Hong Kong. These initiatives 
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were described by officers to generate trust and enhance cooperation.56 Different from the EU 
case study, this is here a dangerous endeavour as cooperation could lead to human rights 
infringements. The concept of trust seems to be therefore independent of human rights 





Australia’s nine jurisdictions (six states, two territories and federal) are not sovereign nation 
states, but are comparable in this context as each has distinct criminal laws and procedure as 
well as a separate police force. Furthermore, the Australian territory is bigger than the EU 
with 28 jurisdictions;  hence there are unique policing problems in remote border regions that 
have the potential to be tackled by police cooperation mechanisms. Australia has no national 
human rights charter, but is a party to the ICCPR. Some states have created human rights 
legislation, but it is of little relevance to fair trial rights. With regard to legitimacy, the states 
forming the Australian federation should be more homogenous than the EU. All systems 
derive from the common law and more precisely the British and Irish legal systems. As 
Australia is a signatory to the ICCPR, it is applicable in all states. Considering the prominent 
similarities of the systems, trust should exist, based on common norms/values, goals and 
personal context (joint training). The existing similar levels of legitimacy should therefore, 
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following the EU example, have led to cross-border legislation facilitating police 
cooperation. 
However, while close informal cooperation between the nine jurisdictions exists in 
border regions, this has not generally led to the creation of bilateral and multilateral 
legislation facilitating cross-border police cooperation, nor has it impacted on Australian 
federal, or the harmonisation of state, territory and Commonwealth legislation. It has also not 
led to the creation of any legal cooperation frameworks. Advanced cooperation in Australian 
border regions, unlike in the EU, is also in turn not influenced by federal or harmonised 
legislation. Furthermore, federal agencies, within the limits of their competences, perform a 
number of cross-border tasks, which have made such developments less necessary. 
Australia’s top-down attempts to harmonise criminal law and procedure or introduce systems 
of mutual recognition of laws have rarely led to harmonised implementation and cooperative 
practice. This lack of harmonised legal frameworks and clearly defined competences presents 
challenges. While the predominant informality of cooperation can have advantages, it also 
leads to divergent approaches between state and territory on the one hand and the more 
formal federal agencies on the other and makes a clear determination of competencies 
difficult.57 
The only ‘formal’ strategy that exists in Australia is limited to three jurisdictions: 
South Australia, Northern Territory and Western Australia. In the Ngaanyatjarra 
Pitijantjatjara Yankuntjatjara (NPY) lands, which are the sparsely inhabited border region in 
the centre of Australia, problems of domestic violence, child abuse, sexual abuse, substance 
abuse, and other forms of offending behaviour became apparent through a women’s initiative 
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in the region. The cooperation measures created to counter these issues are probably the most 
advanced of all Australian border areas. The Western Australia Cross-Border Justice Act 
2008, the South Australia Cross-Border Justice Act 2009 and the Northern Territory Cross-
Border Justice Act 2008 allow police to exercise their powers (within certain limits) in each 
of the three jurisdictions under recognition of the laws of their state or territory. In other 
Australian border regions a police officer must be sworn into the other system to exercise his 
or her power in the other jurisdiction (typically they are assigned the powers of a ‘special 
constable’ as in the Police (Special Provisions) Act 1901 New South Wales. However, while 
this strategy has the clear potential to grow beyond the three jurisdictions, attempts to apply 
this strategy to other states have not been made.58 The cooperation mechanism is nevertheless 
far more advanced than anything that has been established in the EU, which shows that 
similarities (and presumably the underlying trust and similar levels of legitimacy due to these 
systemic similarities) do create close cooperation. 
More important than the NPY lands cooperation is the fact that Australia is, apart from 
the state and territory police, also policed by federal agencies, such as the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC). Giving a superior entity the 
power to establish common agencies with enforcement powers might not show trust between 
the systems, but trust in the superior entity. Comparing this situation with the EU, trust 
between the EU Member States has led to the establishment of the common supranational 
agency Europol, but has fallen short of giving this agency enforcement powers. It could 
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therefore be concluded that the higher the levels of similarity with regard to legitimacy are 
within an entity (Australia has different jurisdictions, but they all derived from one system, 
while the EU encompasses very diverse civil and common law systems within one human 
rights framework), the more likely they will be to cede power to the superior entity. This is 
not to say that there is not a constant quarrel between the Australian state and territory and 
the federal levels regarding competencies.59 However, as a system, the trust is here advanced 
to the point that a common representative agency can be tolerated. This seems to be an even 
further stage of trust than in the EU. 
Furthermore, similar to both the EU and Greater China formal and informal 
practitioner forums and agencies or education and training initiatives have developed in 
Australia encompassing all systems and often initiated by the federal level. This is a 
consequence of harmonised laws not necessarily translating into harmonised practice. 
Harmonised and regional laws have not been able to overcome all differences between 
constituent jurisdictions, which makes personal level trust building necessary. It is interesting 
to see that these trust building initiatives can even be identified in the Australian context, 
despite the pronounced similarity of legal systems and organisational structures among the 
states. Common training and knowledge exchange therefore seems to be necessary in all 
systems. 
Australia could, apart from the similarity in establishing training initiatives, be seen as 
a system with great similarities and little formalisation at the bilateral and multilateral levels. 
Interviews with practitioners for a previous study,60 indicated that formalisation would be 
                                                 




welcomed and that the case-by-case approach can be tiring and highly dependent on single 
individuals. However, the systems were mostly seen as so legally similar that a real necessity 
for formalisation from a legal perspective did not exist. Furthermore, when cases cross 
borders within the Australian federation, they theoretically do fall within the competences of 
the AFP (at least if they are drug crimes, telecommunication or terrorism related). This has 






The interrelatedness of trust, legitimacy and regulation in the area of police cooperation has 
proven to be rather different from the ‘traditional’ views of trust and legitimacy discussed in 
the first part of this chapter. While the legitimacy debate was shortened by simply assuming 
that legitimacy levels are related to the implementation of international and regional human 
rights standards, this has not made the assessment of trust and its effect on legitimacy any 
easier.  
It can be concluded that trust is established in all systems by common goals, common 
norms/values and personal contacts. This becomes particularly apparent through the fact that 
all systems foster personal contacts through education and training. However, the three trust 
indicators do not have to be present at the same time. A common goal can be the driver of 
trust and even ensuing regulation despite major differences of legitimacy levels between the 
 
 
cooperating systems. It also became very clear that the trust established to promote cross-
border law enforcement is not necessarily related to trust between the systems or the other 
agencies in general. So, other than the assertion by Fichera that ‘trust affects legitimacy and 
legitimacy affects trust, as the more legitimate agencies are the more they are likely to trust 
each other’,61 the analysis of police cooperation strategies resulted in the view that legitimacy 
affects trust, but trust does not affect legitimacy in the area of police cooperation. 
While police in all three systems addressed can trust each other, even to the point of 
formally regulating their engagements across borders, this has absolutely no effect on the 
legitimacy of the other system or how police view that system with regard to legitimacy. The 
common goal and personal contacts can create the trust independently of the legitimacy of the 
system. This is likely to produce outcomes detrimental to safeguarding the rights of the 
defendant. Put differently, if Fichera’s assertion is true, we need to redefine ‘legitimacy’ in 
the police cooperation context. If we detach legitimacy from the notion that people have to 
accept the state and twist it to the notion that police as a state agent need to accept the other 
police, we can rid the legitimacy concept of its human rights component and replace this with 
common (good or bad) values and goals. This brings to the fore the quintessential dilemma of 
policing.  
What can be asserted is that legitimacy (applying the human rights definition) does 
influence trust. The common human rights frameworks in the EU have impacted on how 
police can cooperate and this could similarly be observed in the Australian context. Where a 
common norm/value basis is present, cooperation mechanisms are more likely to exist. This 
was also confirmed in the Chinese case study as similar systems were more likely to 
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cooperate through a formalised legal basis. If fundamental rights were not an inherent part of 
legitimacy in the police cooperation context, these observations could not have been made. 
However, it must be concluded that similarities of legitimacy levels are just as important in 
the establishment of trust and cooperation as human rights. 
Finally, the stages of trust within an entity comprised of different systems could be 
categorised as: 
1. Bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements based on 
situational trust (common goals, personal contacts, common 
norms, but not necessarily all three need to be present to create 
regulation) when systems show major differences in legitimacy 
levels. 
 
2. Supranational frameworks as well as multilateral frameworks 
between all systems within an entity based on trust both 
between the systems and towards the supranational level 
(multilateral frameworks being more influenced by common 
goals and personal contacts, while supranational frameworks 
are initiated by common goals and related values/norms) when 
systems show differences at the criminal justice level, but not at 
the human rights level. 
 
3. Superior agencies established to represent the group of systems 
based on both the trust between the systems, but also the 
superior (federal) level (trust between systems based on 
common goals and personal contacts, trust towards the superior 
level based on the common norms/values) when systems are 
similar both at the criminal justice as well as at the human 
rights level. 
